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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
EVIDENCE - REPORTED TESTIMONY OF DECEASED WITNESS -
SUBSTANTIALLY SIMiLAI OFFENSEs.-Testimony of the victim of a
felonious assault given at a preliminary hearing where the victim
was the only witness against the accused was offered in evidence in
the subsequent trial for murder. The witness-victim, allegedly as a
result of the attack, had dropped dead while on the stand at the pre-
liminary hearing after his examination in chief and cross exami-
nation in the presence of the accused. The circuit court sustained a
plea in abatement to the indictment as found upon a reporter's
transcript, whose correctness was unquestioned, of testimony of the
only witness on the issue of identity, since dead. Held, that such
testimony was admissible for the reason that the issue involved in
the second trial was substantially of the same nature as the issue in-
vestigated at the preliminary examination. Judgment reversed, in-
dictment reinstated, and case remanded. State v. Dawson, 40 S. E.
(2d) 306 ('W. Va. 1946).
The precise ground of decision is that the law does not permit
an examination concerning the legality or the sufficiency of testi-
inony taken before a grand jury upon which an indictment has been
based; but the opinion embodies a considered discussion of the ad-
missibility of testimony of the sort here involved. An exception to
the hearsay rule admits in a subsequent action the reported testi-
mony of an unavailable witness given at a prior trial or preliminary
hearing if the parties and issues are the same. 5 WIamoRr-E, Evi-
DENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1396. While the rule seems simple, the
courts have approached the problem of identity with varying de-
grees of liberality or strictness of interpretation. Generally the
testimony of a witness given at a preliminary examination or trial is
inadmissible in a subsequent action unless such examination or trial
was had in a judicial tribunal, Putnal v. State, 56 Fla. 86, 47 So. 864
(1908), and the witness testified under oath, HIawkins v. United
States, 3 Olda. Cr. 651, 108 Pac. 561 (1910), and the issues and
parties were the same as in the case on trial, Ptwnal v. State., supra.,
Somers v. State, 56 Tex. Cr. 475, 113 S. E. 533 (1908), and unless the
witness is now unavailable. Unavailability is said to exist if the
witness is dead, Parks v. Commonwealth, 109 Va. 807, 63 S. E. 462
(1909), insane, Hawkins v. United States, supra, out of the state
permanently or for an indefinite period, People 'v. Barker, 144 Cal.
705, 78 Pac. 266 (1904), unable to testify on account of sickness or
physical disability, Hawkins v. Uniteed States, supra, or if, after due
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diligence, he is unable to be found, People v. Lewandowski, 143 Cal.
574, 77 Pac. 467 (1904). In criminal cases, there is the additional
requirement that the accused must have been present and given an
opportunity for cross-examination at the former hearing. Common-
wealth v. Lenousky, 206 Pa. 277, 55 Atl. 977 (1903) ; State v. Stew-
art, 85 Kan. 404, 116 Pac. 489 (1911).
In both civil and criminal cases, the orthodox view represented
by the older cases, in line with what has been called the majority
view, Note (1932) 79 A. L. R. 1402, have admitted prior testimony
only if the issues and parties were identical. Metropolitan Street
Ry. v. Gumby, 99 Fed. 192 (C. C. A. 2d, 1900) ; Simmons v. State,
129 Ala. 41, 29 So. 929 (1900) ; Miller v. Gillespie, 54 W. Va. 450, 46
S. E. 451 (1903). Accordingly, in a case somewhat similar to the
principal one, it was held that robbery charged at a preliminary
hearing was not sufficiently identical with a subsequent charge of
murder, even though the blow inflicted in effecting the robbery
caused the subsequent death. Dukes v. State, 80 ]!'fiss. 353, 31 So.
744 (1902). But a more recent and liberal trend admits former
testimony so long as there is substantial identity of issues and parties.
State v. Gaetano, 96 Conn. 306, 114 Atl. 82 (1921), State v. Brown,
331 Mo. 556, 56 S. W. (2d) 405 (1932) : Lyon v. Rhode Island Co.,
38 R. I. 252, 94 Ail. 893 (1915) ; 5 WIGMIoR, op. cit. supra at §
1387. Numerous jurisdictions hold different crimes based on the
same act. or different degrees of the same crime, sufficiently identi-
cal. State v. Wilson, 24 Kan. 138 (1880) ; Hart v. State, 15 Tex.
App. 202 (1883) (assault with intent to kill, and murder) ; State v.
Swiden, 62 S. D. 208, 252 N. W. 628 (1934) (assault and robbery,
and murder) ; State v. O'Brien, 81 Iowa 88, 46 N. W. 752 (1890)
(assault and battery, and murder) ; Regina v. Beeston, 6 Cox Cr. Ca.
425 (1854) (wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm, and
murder) ; Commonwealth v. Ryhal, 274 Pa. 40, 118 Atl. 358 (1922)
(rape, attempted rape and felonious assault, and murder). But
some courts have refused to hold issues growing out of the same act
to be substantially the same. Dukes v. State, supra, (robbery, and
murder) ; Stone v. State 111 Tex. Cr. 547, 15 S. W. (2d) 18 (1928)
(driving car while intoxicated, and murder) ; State v. Kenstler, 49
S. D. 551, 207 N. W. 535 (1926) (altering brand of another's cow,
and larceny of the same cow). Prior to the principal case, it was
not clear whether West Virginia had adopted the liberal view. In
Carrico v. West Virginia Central & P. Ry., 39 W. Va. 86, 19 S. E.
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571 (1894) ; Patterson v. New River & P. C. Ry., 87 W. Va. 177, 104
S. E. 491 (1920), and State v. Sauls, 97 AV. Va. 184, 124 S. E. 670
(1924), the subsequent trial was that of the same issue. and no prob-
lem of unidentical issues was present. Since the courts, in general,
have broadly developed most exceptions to the hearsay rule to allow
as much of the evidence as is trustworthy to come before the court
and jury in order to get all the facts of the case, it is submitted that
the West Virginia court in the principal case has avoided the "nar-
row and pedantic illiberality" often applied to the problem.
M. S. K.
NEcGLIGENCE- es Ipsa Loquitur-XCLUSIVENESS OF DEFEND-
ANT'S CONTROL OVER RESIDUAL CIRCU!1STAONCES AFTER ALL ELEMENTS
OF SHARED CONTROL ELItNATmD.-Plaintiff'S intestate, a brake-
man employed by defendant, was killed when a freight car upon
which he was riding was derailed and plaintiff sought damages
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 53
STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. § 51 (1940). There was evidence that
deceased had signalled the engineer to stop, thrown a switch to put
the cars on a siding, climbed back upon the car, and signalled the
e~gineer to proceed. Plaintiff was unable to show any evidence of
particular acts of negligence. The district court directed a verdict
for defendant on the first count alleging negligence of defendant
with respect to car, track or roadbed but submitted the second count
tlleging negligence generally, with no particulars specified to the
jury on the theory of res ipsa loqaitur. Following verdict and judg-
ment for plaintiff, the circuit court of appeals reversed, because de-
fendant did not have exclusive control over all the probable causa-
tive factors connected with the injury. Held, that the jury could
from the circumstances fairly infer negligence of the defendant
upon finding that the deceased was free from any negligence that
contributed to the derailment. Judgment reversed. Jesionowski
v Boston & Ma ie R. R., .67 S. Ct. 401 (U. S. 1947).
It is generally accepted formula that three essentials for the
application of res ipsa loquitur are (1) a type of accident which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence (2) caused by
al agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the de-
fendant and (3) not attributable to any voluntary action or want of
care of the person injured. Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233
(1912); 4 WOmORE, EVmENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2509. The instant
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